Naxalbari Movement
It was exactly 43 years ago in 1967 that a minor clash between a police force and a group of armed peasants took place in an obscure corner of West Bengal. But it unleashed a force of events, which escalated over the years into a political movement, that derived its name from that area and brought about far-reaching changes in India’s socio-cultural scene. Today it evokes a variety of strong emotions ranging from admiration to denunciation, cutting across the political lines of the established parties. The movement itself is also hard pressed by new challenges and endemic splits. Yet, we cannot deny that even after four decades of its tortuous and self-divisive and often self- destructive odyssey, the movement that started in Naxalbari and now known as the Naxalite movement, still remains a force to reckon with. What is peculiar to the Naxalite Movement is not its physical occupation of, and administrative control over,land, but its abiding appeal among the dispossessed and underprivileged rural poor in certain parts of the country. The movement asserted the demands of the poor and landless peasantry in a way that shook the then atrophied Indian political scene. It sensitized the rest of our society to their desperate efforts to escape the intolerable conditions of economic oppression and social humiliation. Ideology Ideology is a set of ideas that form the basis of an economic or political theory or a particular group or person who holds them. Every movement has its own ideology. To know the ideology of the Naxalite movement we will have to study the nature of the movement first. Naxalism arose from certain basic factors-social injustice, economic inequality and the failure of the system to redress the grievances of large sections of people who suffered and continue to suffer. Here the idea is to create a classless society, which is free of any kind of inequity. Although land redistribution occupied the central stage of the movement, we should bear in mind that it is just an issue of the movement, which was popular at that point of time. The ultimate aim is to eradicate exploitation. The leaders behind the movement had a belief –“those who by economics judge every struggle by the amount of paddy seized or the size of land peasant received. They never judge by the yardstick whether the fighting consciousness of the peasants had increased. The fighting consciousness of the peasantry should be directed against the state machinery and the feudal class; without destroying the two no land reforms could be possible, since they stood against the interests of the landless and poor peasants.” One more important component of the ideology is the use of armed struggle. But we need to understand that it is just only a means to achieve a broader objective. As the upper classes are in a very dominant position, it is not possible to uproot them except through armed struggle. So Naxalites resort to violence only when realize that it is indispensable to the movement. So violence is just only a means and not the end itself. Again Naxalism should not be looked only for the benefit of agrarian peasants. It is something that transcends agrarian reality and relates to whatever field where there is inequality. So the Ideology behind the movement can be stated in the following points
• India’s liberation could be achieved along China’s path.
• An arm struggle is the only way out.
• Bringing a new social order, free of social inequality and class disparity.
Political Situation in West Bengal during the movement:
Naxalite movement derives its name from Naxalbari, a small place in Siliguri subdivision of Darjeeling district of West Bengal. It all started in 1967 after the first non-congress government came into power under the name of United Front Government. The dominant forces in the government were the Leftists. The main forces were the CPI and the CPI (M). They represented the aspirations of the marginalized and the poor. The minister-in-charge of Land Revenue was Harekrishna Konar who was a veteran peasant leader. In an interview with his party mouthpiece Ganashakti, he made his intentions clear about the quick distribution of surplus land and he further asked for peasant initiative and organized force. What he did not realize was that the aspirations of the poor peasantry were already on a high note and his invitation escalated them further. As the later developments showed they went far beyond his expectations. Although there were no doubts about the intentions of the leftists in the government about the redistribution, the path to achieve the goals was not that simple. There were some constraints before government. To name a few first they were not sure about how to recover the land from the landlords. Second the landlords could take the help of law to delay the seizure of land and thus postpone the redistribution for an indefinite period. Third was the working of the bureaucracy. There were some instances of even defying the orders of the ministers. As a result of these obstacles, the government could not implement the land reforms quickly. The CPI (M) was in a difficult situation because it was in the power so it could not totally do away the legal and official procedure and on the other hand the aspirations of the peasantry had to be satisfied. Everyone was not happy with government policy of redistributing the land through legal process. One of such prominent figures was Charu Mazumdar who was attacking Harekrishna Konar on three accounts. The first point was that he submitted to the bureaucrats and feudal gentry. The second point was that there might be disputes among the peasants who acquired the land through legal process and those who got it through forceful means. The third point was that the peasants who would acquire the land through legal process might eventually become a complacent middle farmer. Developments at Naxalbari: In this light a peasants’ conference was held under the auspices of CPI (M) at Naxalbari and it gave a call for ending the monopoly ownership of land by landlords, organization and arming of peasants to destroy the resistance of landlords. Among the sponsors of the conference were Kanu Sanyal and Jangal Santhal who later became prominent leaders of the Naxalbari movement. Both of them were in favor of political propaganda and mass mobilization what was opposed by Charu Mazumdar. He wanted only action. So there were some differences on the part of the strategy to be followed but they were clear on many points such as that India’s liberation could be achieved only through China’s path, propagation of politics of agrarian struggle among the working class and the peasantry and building up a secret party to prepare cadres for this purpose. As a result of those differences pointed out already, Siliguri Local committee cadres decided to go on the path of mass movements whereas West Dinajpur unit decided to stick to the idea of Charu babu. Now the mobilization started on a large scale. From March to April (1967) all the villages of the Naxalbari were organized and 15000 to 20000 peasants were enrolled as whole time activists. They soon occupied the land in the name of peasants’ committees, burnt all land records, cancelled all hypothetical debts, and passed death sentences on oppressive landlords. They also formed armed bands by looting guns from the landlords, armed themselves with conventional weapons and set up a parallel administration to look after the villages. By May of that year itself three or four places were totally under the control of rebels. In the meantime Charu babu addressed a meeting of the cadres and asked them to always be on the side of the poor and landless peasant. He said that our relation with rich farmers would always be of struggling nature. Observing that the situation going out of control UF government woke up and Harekrishna Konar was sent to the Naxalbari region and he asked the rebels to put down their arms and file the petition for the distribution of land vested with the government. It was also agreed that the all the persons wanted by Police would also surrender. But the agreement was never implemented. Just after the return of minister from that place, a Police camp was established there. In the wake of these developments the first serious clash between Police and the peasants occurred on 23 May 1967, when a policeman was killed and in retaliation police opened fire on a crowd of villagers and killed nine people. Out of them six were women and two were children. This incident created tensions within and outside the United Front government. The West Bengal Secretariat condemned the incident and accused Chief Minister Ajoy Mukherjee, an ex-Congressman of laying ‘one sided stress on police measures to maintain law and order’. Meanwhile news of clashes between peasants and landlords kept pouring in from Naxalbari and between 3rd and 10th of June. There were as many as eighty incidents of dacoity, two murders and also one abduction. Mr. B. Chavan Union Home Minister told the Lok Sabha that a reign of terror has been created in Darjeeling. By the end of June while the leadership of CPI (M) was openly against the Naxalbari rebels. In Calcutta several groups within and outside CPI (M) were coming together. These groups formed the Naxalbari Peasants’ Struggle Aid Committee, which became a nucleus of separate party of the future. CPI (M) expelled 19 members in the light of the formation of the committee. In the meantime some other important developments were also taking place. On 28th June Radio Peking supported the movement and dubbed the United Front government as a ‘tool of Indian reactionaries to deceive the people’. This was the first incident of Chinese support to rebels and of Peking’s disenchantment with CPI (M). On 12th July a major police action was launched. Although Chief Minister claimed that it was cabinet’s decision, but CPI (M) tried to dissociate itself from the police action. The Chief Minister also came under attack. By 20th July the prominent leaders like Jangal Santhal were arrested and by October 1967 an apparent lull was set in Naxalbari. Assessment of the Naxalbari Movement and causes for its failure: Coming to the evaluation of the Naxalbari Movement, we should keep in mind that although it was a moderate success it was suppressed within a few months. It enjoyed immense mass support, but it could not sustain for a long period of time. There are mainly two versions for the failure of the movement. One is from the point of view of Kanu Sanyal and other one is from the point of view of supporters of Charu Mazumdar. Kanu Sanyal’s in his famous Report on the Terai Peasants’ Movement has penned down some of the reasons. The main reason according to him was excessive reliance on the spontaneity of the masses and taking them as armed forces. Among the other reasons were the inclusion of some vagabonds and making them leaders of the movement. Lack of proper plan for the redistribution of grabbed land led to conflicts among the peasants. But according to him the main defect was failure to establish a powerful mass base. Talking about military weakness of the movement, Sanyal admitted that the revolutionaries underrated the strength of the State machinery and thought that United Front Government would not go to the extent of suppressing the movement.
This blog is useful as it gives the history of the Communist concept of land reforms. In West Bengal, the Left Front govt. did this work under the direct supervision of the Minister-in-Charge Mr. Harekrishna Konar. His able assistant was an IAS officer Debabrata Banerjee. And all this was successfully done before the death of Mr.Konar in 1975.
ReplyDeleteA very fine article. Legally speaking, can you please offer your views as to who was wrong? or whose fault it was? or if we have to pin point the culprit, who was the culprit? Pramod/ Mumbai/ 12-04-2010
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